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Introduction
This chapter uses Uskali Mäki’s (2009) concepts of “good” and “bad” imperialism
to investigate the “economics imperialism” thesis. If science expands by offering
(a) consilience, and (b) epistemological and ontological unity – that is, it explains
more phenomena with greater parsimony – then this is good scientific expansion.
Economics imperialism is only bad if the methodology of economics expands
outside its domain without increasing understanding in the above manners.
I take from Steve Clarke and Adrian Walsh the view that the burden of
proof is on the shoulders of an analyst claiming to identify bad imperialism
because she needs to account for “why imperialistic ideas are liable to succeed
in the disciplines they attempt to colonise, despite their lack of explanatory
virtue” (Clarke and Walsh 2009, 202). This chapter argues three points. First,
alleged “economics imperialism” is better described as “rational choice imperialism”
because there is a disciplinary break between the earlier schools of classical and
neoclassical economics versus game theory. Second, following Mäki, the advances
and imperializing power of rational choice is derivational, rather than epistemolo-
gical, conciliatory, or ontological. Third, the stakes of accurately identifying
and even resisting rational choice imperialism follow from it potentially
reflecting a type of politically motivated imperialism that may not contribute to
scientific understanding. Clarke andWalsh recognize that some forms of disciplinary
imperialism dismiss alternative manners of inquiry, and potentially also inform
common-sense views of valid or appropriate social ontologies.
1 Good and bad “scientific imperialism”
The case of scientific imperialism focal to this chapter is that of economics
imperialism which refers to starkly polarized territory in which many theorists
are critical of the increasing encroachment of economic assumptions on
domains of inquiry formerly operating with alternative approaches (Sen 1977;
Heath 2008), and other researchers are celebratory (Becker 1978; Posner 1984;
Buchanan 1975). However, before discussing economics imperialism specifi-
cally, it is useful to follow Mäki in developing tools to investigate this so-called
“imperialism” in neutral terms. Mäki recommends having an open mind as to
whether disciplinary imperialism is “good” or “bad,” and therefore articulates a
means to discover whether disciplinary expansion is consistent with scientific
unification and greater explanatory power. Suppose, for example, that a scien-
tific theory such as Isaac Newton’s theory of gravitation is able to explain the
movement of objects both on Earth and throughout the heavens, then
although this modern physics colonizes astronomy with the same analytic
structure applied to the motion of Earth-bound corporeal bodies, no credible
philosopher of science will denounce this expansion as contrary to the princi-
ples of effective scientific inquiry. As Clarke and Walsh (2009) point out, in
fact it seems likely that if a body of theory is applied to a new domain of study
and those theorists find it useful, then prima facie it would seem that this exercise
shares common ground with the widespread and self-sustaining acceptance of
Newtonian physics. Thus Mäki notes that, “unification provides a norm that is
firmly embedded in the institution called science” (Mäki 2009, 262). This type
of expansion fits comfortably with the belief in scientific progress.
Mäki spells out features of a successful extension of a scientific method from
one domain to others. Unification of inquiry should be effective with respect
to ontology, pragmatics, and epistemology. For the first, Maki states that,
“ontological unification is a matter of redescribing large classes of apparently
independent explanandum phenomena as forms or manifestations of a common
system of entities, causes, and mechanisms” (Mäki 2009, 364). The core idea is
that a scientific theory may expand credibly if it applies to a broader ontology
akin to Newtonian gravitation pertaining to motion both within and beyond
Earth’s atmosphere. As I will explore below, in the case of the expansion of
economic science, it would exhibit the property of greater ontological rele-
vance if its mode of explanation successfully explains not only traditional
market transactions, but, for example, also all rational decision-making.
Economists propose to achieve this aim (Hausman 2012).
With respect to pragmatism, Mäki refers to two types of consilience: sub-
sumption and cardinality. If one theory more successfully explains both phe-
nomena to which it initially was applied and in addition those previously
explained by another theory, then the broader theory has more explanatory
power. The Copernican model of celestial mechanics explained both the
Earth’s movement vis-à-vis the sun and that of the other planets’ orbits around
the sun, and over time was seen to offer a more synthetic perspective than that
of the Ptolomaic system with its well-known reliance on epicycles (Kuhn
1962). Similarly, if one theory is able to explain more bundles of facts than
another, then that more encompassing theory seems obviously more effec-
tive. Mathematical models of waves can explain these patterns of energy trans-
fer in multiple substances to include radio waves, water waves, and sound
waves. Again, looking ahead to the theme of economics imperialism, if game
theory can explain both markets and crime whereas neoclassical economics
could only explain markets, then game theory seems to offer greater explanatory
power.
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With respect to epistemology, Mäki points out that scientists prefer parsi-
mony in theory choice, typically deferring to theories making the fewest
assumptions. Thus, if empirical tests are used to determine the accuracy of
hypotheses generated by theories, and the data support two different theories,
the one with greater parsimony will likely be preferred. Again, in reference to
the expansion of economics beyond its borders, if rational choice and Freudian
psychology both explain individuals’ consumptive choices, but rational choice
has fewer assumptions, then likely theorists will find it to be the more epistemically
effective.
In his discussion of features of scientific theories that make them more
compelling and able to expand their domains of relevance, Mäki also intro-
duces an alternative means by which theories can increase their range of
application. He calls this a type of unification that proceeds through the power
of derivation as opposed to greater explanation of ontological phenomena. The
idea is that a theory may provide the means to derive many conclusions ana-
lytically, and hence generate an impressive quantity of results that cover a range
of phenomena in domains formerly addressed by alternative theories and
methods. Yet such a theory is limited to derivational unification if its formal
results are not vindicated by empirical verification. Below I will argue that the
concept of imperialism through derivational unification is particularly relevant
to the type of expansion characterized by rational choice.
To summarize, then, I concur with Mäki that the expansion of a scientific
theory from one domain to another appears to be consistent with the aims of
science. Hence it is valuable to identify features of scientific unification that are
consistent with the enterprise of science, and the celebration of increased
ontological, practical, and epistemological applicability is thus warranted.
However, Mäki does alert us to a type of unification through the multi-
plication of analytic derivations without empirical vindication that could char-
acterize a manner of expansion that may not enhance the explanatory power of
scientific inquiry.
2 Revisiting the “economics imperialism” thesis
George Stigler’s “Economics – The Imperial Science?” (1984) discusses how
the discipline of economics “has been aggressive in addressing central problems
in a considerable number of neighboring social disciplines without any invita-
tions” (Stigler 1984, 311). He describes how theorists have made forays in
modeling diverse social phenomena like criminal activity and family planning
(e.g., Becker 1978) using concepts and methods from economics. Thus, the
exercise of economics imperialism exhibited by Anthony Downs (1957), James
M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962), Thomas Schelling (1960), Michael
Taylor (1976) and Russell Hardin (1982) is generally accepted to represent
applying economic arguments to democracy, the social contract, law, conflict
and conflict resolution, cooperation, and collective action. Before interrogating
this understanding of the type of imperialism exhibited by game theory in the
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next section, the goal here is to provide a charitable description of what is
normally referred to by the phrase “economics imperialism” (Lazear 2000;
Miller 1997, 1181). This task is helpful due to the common currency of the
phrase and the imagery that this common lore narrative evokes.
The essence of the economics methodology being expropriated by other
fields, which include political science, international relations, jurisprudence,
public policy, arbitration, conflict resolution, sociology, and psychology, is that
rational agents maximize utility in all decision-making independent of its context.
Thus individual choice can be modeled according to whether actors behave
consistently given that outcomes are usually realized in accordance with prob-
abilities rather than certainties. Additionally, interactions are modeled assuming that
individuals maximize individual gain competitively. The assumptions under-
lying the disciplinary unification are parsimonious and only demand that actors
have complete and consistent preferences over outcomes (Hargreaves Heap and
Varoufakis 2004, 8); and that, from these assumptions, utility functions can be
constructed that pertain to diverse choice situations from markets to politics
(Mueller 2003; Pettit 2002), and love and truth-telling (e.g., Becker 1978;
Lewis 1969) to evolutionary science (Trivers 1971; Smith 1982; Dawkins 1979).
Nothing seems to be outside the confines of this application of bare bones
individualistic maximization to every conceivable domain of rational judgment
(Hausman 2012). Even the sympathy characterized by Adam Smith’s (1982
[1759]) impartial spectator has been subjected to the assumption that all individuals
maximize some type of gain in every decision and interaction (Pettit 2002). If
actors demonstrate altruism, then this is merely another strategy by which they
benefit, either by aiding the promotion of their genetic identity through kin, or
seeking immortality and longevity through reputation (Dawkins 1979).
In considering these examples of economics imperialism it is evident that one
particular brand of economic theorizing underlies this trend: rational choice
theory. This is a point acknowledged by Mäki (2002, 239). Here the funda-
mental concepts are narrow self-interest and comporting with the axioms of
expected utility theory (Mäki 2002, 237). Economics imperialism is not that of
Adam Smith’s supply/demand analysis; it is not the neoclassicals’ formalization
of diminishing marginal utility; nor is it Keynesianism or macroeconomics. The
economic method underlying the late 20th-century domination of economics
over other disciplines is specifically the game theory revolution which encom-
passes expected utility theory as an intrinsic part (von Neumann and Morgen-
stern 1953 [1944]). Although Mäki also refers to “cost benefit analysis” being
essential to economics imperialism (Mäki 2013, 332; see also Clarke and Walsh
2009, 196), it is unclear whether individual expected utility maximization is a
class of cost–benefit analysis, vice versa, or if they are derived from the same
fundamental theory.
So far I have discussed Mäki’s classification of “good” and “bad” imperialism
with the former representing effective scientific unification that reflects pro-
gressive understanding of phenomena, and the latter involving “new types of
explanandum phenomena [that] are located in territories that are occupied by
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[different] disciplines … and where [the colonizing discipline] presents itself
hegemonically as being in possession of superior theories and methods, thereby
excluding rival theories and approaches from consideration” (Mäki 2009, 274).
Economics imperialism is synonymous with rational choice imperialism, and it
remains to be determined whether the multidisciplinary adoption of game
theory (encompassing expected utility theory, which serves as the basis of
decision theory applicable in parametric contexts without any interactive part-
ners) represents a good or bad form of science expansion.1 If game theory helps
to unify our understanding of human behavior with parsimonious assumptions
that encompass a greater range of social phenomena, which are subject to
empirical verification, or offers greater efficacy of explanation than alternative
theories, then it qualifies as constructive expansion.
The next section scrutinizes the rational choice revolution first as a species of
economics imperialism, and draws attention to how it may be more appropriate
to view this theoretical transformation as a distinctive rupture contrasting with
prior economic theorizing. In fact, game theory first established itself in fields
external to economics before finally colonizing economics itself. The following
section interrogates whether rational choice offers epistemic unification through
either encompassing a greater ontological range of experience, or through
offering greater empirical verification. This section raises the possibility that the
unification and expansion offered by rational choice is better understood as
falling into the derivational category that Mäki argues is not a legitimate species
of scientific progress.
The stakes of accurately understanding the nature of economics imperialism,
as stated by Clarke and Walsh, is that if one method of scientific inquiry is
adopted in another field, either voluntarily with the hopes of professional suc-
cess, or coercively due to the allocation of opportunities for funding and pres-
tige, then it is possible both that alternative theories may be lost, and alternative
ontologies or fields of value may recede from sight (Clarke and Walsh 2009).
This is because alternative theories may afford forms of explanation that focus
on individual identity in terms of types, without being able to speak to
experiential data that pertain to specific individuals (Mäki 2002, 253). Further-
more, I will suggest that possibly subjecting individuals to environments in
which they become data points for the type of behavioral decision-making
analysis typical of rational choice (either in experiments, or in the process of
designing institutions, public policies, and legal frameworks in accordance with
the assumptions and findings of rational choice) may significantly alter their
self-expression to comport with the colonizing means of scientific explanation.
3 Is the “rational choice revolution” really
“economics imperialism”?
It is clear that in many, if not most, theorists’ minds, economics imperialism
and the rational choice revolution are synonymous, dating to the initial pub-
lication of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s Theory of Games and
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Economic Behavior, and gradually becoming first a solidified canon of literature
including Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa’s Games and Decisions, Anthony
Downs’ An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957), James Buchanan and Gordon
Tullock’s Calculus of Consent (1962), Mancur Olson’s Theory of Collective Action,
and Gary Becker’s Economic Approach to Human Behavior (1978). This under-
standing is independent from whether theorists support or criticize the wide-
spread acceptance of rational choice. Viewing rational choice as a product of
economics, rather than as post-World War II economics transformed by game
theory, may have been encouraged by Morgenstern’s vision of revolutionizing
the study of economics in terms of strategic interactions (Leonard 1992).
Moreover, the early application of game theory to the dual constraint problems
encountered by military planners related gaming, linear programming, and
military worth (cost–benefit analysis) as an exercise of achieving efficiency in
strategy in the late 1940s and 1950s (Erickson 2015; Thomas 2015).
Thus, in this section I question the standard understanding with the aim of
better appreciating the nature of colonization entailed by rational choice. I will
argue that rather than represent the phenomenon of “economics imperialism,”
the rational choice revolution is better thought of as a distinctive break in the
understanding of human agency, from an instrumentalism of using means most
efficiently to achieve ends, to strategic competition among actors to satisfy their
preferences exemplified by complete and consistent rankings over all con-
ceivable end states. Moreover, I further explore the hypothesis that the mis-
representation of the rational choice revolution as economics imperialism falsely
conveys to the disciplinary ascendance of game theory a pedigree of legitimacy
that economics and instrumental rationality achieved starting with Adam Smith
and augmented by the neoclassical economists’ formalization of general equili-
brium theory and economic efficiency. I will argue that in fact the rational
choice revolution is better understood as a new methodology that defines
“rational action” as having consistent preferences over all possible end states,
ranking them on a single and finite scale, and making consistent choices among
potential end states treated as lotteries of outcomes. This view of rational
choice is distinct and at odds with the neoclassical model of rational action that
copies the mathematical formalism of rational mechanics requiring rational
actors to obey the law of diminishing marginal utility (Mirowski 1989). Even if the
rational choice school of thought has imperializing tendencies, these transformed
the discipline of economics itself which previously had only achieved the
recognition of existing as a free-standing science by deliberately demarcating its
territory from psychology and politics (Amadae 2003).
Mäki describes how rational choice seems to reflect a continuity with pre-
ceding forms of economic analysis: “It is well known that the [Lionel] Rob-
binsian ‘definition’ of economics in terms of ends and scarce means … is
powerfully scope-expanding” (Mäki 2009, 358). Here Mäki alludes to the
observations of Jack Hirshleifer, who notes that, “[w]hat gives economics its
imperialist invasive power is that our analytic categories – scarcity, cost, pre-
ferences, opportunities, etc. – are truly universal in applicability [1985, 53]”
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(ibid., 359). The idea is that the neoclassical economists, who used calculus-
based constrained optimization in their models, formalized the formerly dis-
cursive concepts of scarcity, cost, preferences, etc., and that game theorists took
these same formal concepts and then applied them to “reputation, sex, status,
eternal salvation, the meaning of life, and a good night’s sleep” (Hirshleifer
1985, 53; Mäki 2009, 358). Mäki’s list of the colonized fields is lengthy:
“politicians’ and bureaucrats’ behavior, voting and law, crime and punishment,
racial discrimination and slavery, marriage and divorce, pornography and pros-
titution, religion and suicide, drug addiction and abortion, sport and gambling,
rock ‘n’ roll and science” (Mäki 2009, 358).
Even if it is true that rational choice theory is used to model these diverse
social interactions and phenomena, it is not true that this was by extending the
methods of neoclassical economists to new fields of inquiry and areas of human
behavior outside market transactions characterized by ratios of exchange of
scarce and fungible goods. Two points about the nature and scope of economic
science, to which Robbins (1935) dedicated a monograph by that name, are
evident. First, in his endeavor to carefully delimit the boundaries of economic
science, Robbins made clear that the appropriate domain of economic analysis
is the efficient use of scarce means which are traded against each other in spe-
cific ratios depending on individuals’ goals and market prices. The neoclassicals’
domain of economics is that of economic value, usually expressible in monetary
denominations. Here, money is simply one more commodity that is traded for
other goods in precise ratios that must uphold the law of diminishing marginal
utility – if consumers and producers are rational. Second, with this in mind,
possibly countering Karl Marx’s thesis that capitalists end up pursuing monetary
gain as a valuable end in itself, Robbins (1935) clarified that money can never
be an end, but only a mere means. Thus for Robbins, economic science is
strictly limited to the domain of the efficient obtainment of means, which he
treated as finite tangible resources that are useful in precise ratios. The trade-offs
referred to in neoclassical economics are those captured in a two-good pro-
blem: increasing consumption of, for example, bread, must come at the price of
giving up some wine and vice versa (Robbins 1935). Economic science is
strictly the domain of the efficient allocation of means, which are exchangeable,
fungible, scarce resources. Agents have preferences over commodity bundles
that are suitable for representation in a graphic model of an Edgeworth box.
In order for rational choice theory to model diverse considerations ranging
from sex and sleep to suicide and addiction, it was necessary that it wholly
abandon the neoclassical framework of constrained maximization which bor-
rowed the mathematics of the path of least action from physics (Mirowski
1989; Amadae 2003). The early game theorists were fully aware of, and cele-
brated, their clean break free from the perspective of constrained maximization
(von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953 [1944]; Luce and Raiffa 1957). Instead
of individuals ranking commodity bundles or finite means, each exhibiting
unique causal properties consistent with mass and energy, and chemical prop-
erties and compound substances characteristic of periodic elements, the game
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theoretic agents rank outcomes. Sometimes outcomes can be dollar denomina-
tions, or lotteries of varying probabilities of dollar denominations, or possibly
being at war or at peace, or winning or losing an election. Thus, for the
rational choice revolution to be able to expand the domain of economics
beyond the constrained maximization of utility under a budget constraint, its
theoretical foundation first had to reformulate the nature of choice to redefine
rationality from the efficient use of means to the consistent ranking of ends, or
outcomes themselves. Von Neumann and Morgenstern, as well as Luce and
Raiffa, discuss this new formalization of expected utility in careful detail. They
boast that their bold initiative cuts free from the neoclassicists’ limited thinking
of constrained optimization under a budget constraint. Not only do they
reformulate the notion of utility, but they also model strategic interactions in
which individuals maximize their pursuit of anticipated utility against other
like-minded players (Leonard 2010).
Thus, game theory developed largely outside economics from the 1940s
until roughly 1970. It is well known that von Neumann, a mathematical phy-
sicist, and Morgenstern, a less well-known Austrian economist, developed
Theory of Games, a mathematically dense 600-plus-page volume that was almost
entirely ignored by economists (Leonard 1992) until the late 1970s and early
1980s. In the late 1940s and 1950s, early work in game theory was pursued for
military strategy (Erickson 2015), mainly at the Santa Monica-based RAND
Corporation (Amadae 2003, 2016). Perhaps the first economist who can truly
be described as an “economics imperialist,” Thomas Schelling, initially used
game theory to model nuclear deterrence and conflict before going on to
model the segregation of neighborhoods and collective action (Schelling 1960,
1973, 1978; Amadae 2016). Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s initial theory,
which mainly pertained to two-person zero-sum game theory, seemed much
more useful for conflict than applicable to economic exchange in which all
actors were supposed to gain rather than one individual’s gain being someone
else’s loss (Leonard 2010). Game theory was a staple in nuclear deterrence
(Aumann et al. 1967) in the 1960s. It was also developed in evolutionary game
theory as early as the late 1960s (Trivers 1971). It represented a paradigm of
powerful derivational import and its sparse assumptions could be used to model
any interaction in which agents were understood to have consistent preferences
over outcomes (Axelrod 1970).
It is difficult to sustain a thesis of “economics imperialism” if many of the initial
trailblazers had disciplinary homes outside economics (Amadae 2003). Kenneth
J. Arrow is an obvious exception, but even he accepted that the maximization
used in social choice is distinct from the neoclassical concept of maximization
under a budget constraint (Arrow 1963; Amadae 2003, 83–132). Economists as
a community of theorists did not embrace game theory until the late 1970s and
1980s when the Nash mutual-best-reply equilibrium became the accepted solution
concept, in contrast to von Neumann and Morgenstern’s more limited solution
concept based on extending zero-sum theory to non-zero-sum games (Mirowski
2002; Binmore’s introduction to Nash 1996).
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The manner of formulating utility, developed by von Neumann and Mor-
genstern, called “expected utility theory,” displaced the formal models of
diminishing marginal utility and over time became the standard treatment of
utility in economics. However, economists only caught up with work achieved
in other disciplines such as political science (Riker and Ordeshook 1973;
Taylor 1976), nuclear deterrence (Schelling 1960; Schelling and Halperin
1961), international relations (Jervis 1978), public policy analysis (Stokey and
Zeckhauser 1978) and evolutionary game theory (Trivers 1971) after these
other disciplines had already standardized canonical game theoretic literature
(Myerson 1991). Even behavioral economics, which uses rational choice theory
as the standard normative theory of rationality against which to test individuals’
systematic deviations, originated from the work of Daniel Kahneman, a psy-
chologist, and Amos Tversky, a mathematics-trained cognitive scientist and
psychologist (1979). These facts about which theorists, in what disciplines,
played key roles in establishing rational choice theory early on permit us to
stand back and reappraise the economics imperialism thesis, and lead us to the
conclusion that the rational choice revolution is not a species of economists
colonizing other fields so much as the extension of a new formal method to
multiple disciplines that followed from its original statement in Theory of Games
and Economic Behaviour (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953 [1944]) and
application by von Neumann himself to submarine warfare (Leonard 2010).
Before going on to assess the scientific value contributed by game theory to
understand a vast array of human behavior, I would like to draw attention to
the clear means by which game theory purports to apply to all decision-
making. In the words of von Neumann and Morgenstern themselves, they
clearly state that their concept of a solution, or the identification of an outcome
rational players converge on, “is plausibly a set of rules for each participant
which tell him how to behave in every situation which may conceivably arise”
(von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953 [1944], 31). Thus, every conceivable
decision a rational individual may make falls within the purview of expected
utility theory and game theory. Moreover, when it comes to agents’ expected
utility functions, or their complete ranking of all possible outcomes, everything
of relevance to actors’ appraisal of value is argued to be in their preference
orderings (Myerson 1991, 7–8). Preference rankings over outcomes “must be a
total [meaning exhaustively comprehensive] ranking, incorporating every factor
agents take to influence their choices” (Hausman 2012, 34). These default
orthodox expected utility rankings in game theory only consider actors’ eva-
luation of outcomes (Hausman 2012, 53), and yet at the same time assume
these rankings are exhaustively comprehensive (Hausman 2012, 35). Game
theoretic expected utility functions both incorporate these assumptions and
then operationalize a mathematics that provides the means to treat individuals’
choices according to these terms. Rational choice can imperialistically explain
all choice because from its original formulation, expected utility theory was
designed to represent all cognitive information necessary to explain rational
behavior. Thus, in assembling the points put forward in this section, rational
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choice is a new methodology for understanding individuals’ rational choices
that shifts attention from market choice under a budget constraint to consistent
rankings over all possible end states, and taking appropriate strategic choices
given competition against others who similarly seek to secure reational
expectations.
In the next section I suggest that this wider perspective, which is open-
minded about the type and source of imperialism, not only is helpful for
maintaining a neutral vantage point for evaluating the nature of the rational
choice revolution, but also rejects the thesis that the successful and already
vindicated methodology of economic science was exported from economics
into other disciplines on the promise that it could offer greater explanatory
power to achieve scientific unification and consilience. Once rational choice
theory is viewed, as its founders recommend, as a disciplinary rift with neo-
classical economics rather than a further refinement and expansion of this pre-
existing theory, then it becomes easier to evaluate its successes assessed in terms
of ontological and epistemological unification, as well as pragmatic progress in
capturing more data with fewer assumptions. In moving ahead with this ana-
lysis I am grateful for Mäki’s helpful distinction between “derivational” and
“ontological” expansion (Mäki 2009, 263–64).
4 Subjecting the “rational choice revolution” to Mäki’s criteria
for good and bad imperialism
According to Mäki, and I think unarguably, the expansion of one method of
explanation to a broader range of empirical phenomena fits within the under-
standing of scientific inquiry. Yet, even given this tacit recognition that the
envelopment of one discipline by another may well be a positive development
leading to greater explanatory success, Mäki distinguishes criteria that char-
acterize constructive versus destructive imperialism. Obviously, if a theory (a)
can satisfactorily explain a larger range of ontological substrata or properties,
such as either decisions in markets or elections and choices by humans or
single-celled organisms, then this is consistent with science. Similarly, if a
theory (b) can either explain more facts than another theory, or cover the
entire domain of a competing theory in addition to its prior domain, much like
identifying DNA provides a unifying mechanism that sustains both plant and
animal life, then this too would seem to be a happy outcome of scientific
unification. Furthermore, if a theory were able to (c) predict either more or
novel empirical data, such as Albert Einstein’s general relativity theory predicts
gravitational waves, then this empirical means of verification would endorse
this type of scientific expansion to encompass more fields of investigation. The
question is, does rational choice achieve (a), (b), or (c)?
In his discussion of economics imperialism, Mäki paves the way to answering
this question by also identifying “derivational unification.” This refers to
“derivations of conclusions from a set of premises” which can also be a feature
of scientific expansion but, if unmet with verification by empirical tests, may
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provide a means to identify a type of scientific imperialism that does not neces-
sarily advance understanding. Writing in 1985, game theorist Robert Aumann
acknowledges that rational choice theory offers derivational unification which
Mäki describes as “a matter of deriving large classes of explanandum sentences
from a parsimonious set of theoretical sentences or inferential patterns.” Cru-
cially, “theories are regarded as logical formulae, possibly devoid of truth-value,
serving the task of generating implications and saving the phenomena” (Mäki
2009, 363). Aumann directly accepts that game theory is powerful because it
offers the means of derivational unification: “the validity of utility maximiza-
tion does not depend on its being an accurate description of the behavior of
individuals.” He goes on to note that “rather, it derives its being the underlying
postulate that pulls together most of economic theory.” However, Aumann’s crucial
acknowledgment follows because he discloses that rational choice’s basis in the
hypothesis of expected utility maximization cannot be experimentally verified:
While attractive as hypotheses, there is little theory built on them, they pull
together almost nothing; they have few interesting consequences. In judging
utility maximization, we must ask not ‘Is it plausible?’ but ‘What does it tie
together, where does it lead?’”
(Aumann 1985, 46, quoted by Mäki 2009, 364)
This sense in which rational choice offers an elementary set of choice axioms
that define rational action, and can be used by derivation in accordance with game
theory to model any situation reducible to these assumptions, points toward the
almost endless power of the theory to present the means to derive countless formal
models. Game theoretic models are typically tested for their analytic con-
sistency. When they are applied in empirical studies, rather than verifying the
accuracy of the models, these experiments test whether actors behave rationally
given the assumptions built into the model (e.g., Rapoport and Chammah 1965;
Rand et al. 2012). Nobel Prize-winning game theorist Roger B. Myerson admits
that there is no way to empirically test the validity of game theory; instead, as he
puts it, “one can only ask whether a person who understands the model would
feel that he would be making a mistake if he did not make decisions according to
the model” (Myerson 1991, 22). In their skeptical assessment of game theory’s
contributions, Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro (1996) accuse game theorists of
generating formal models but with little value for actually explaining or
understanding social contexts as basic as voting or collective action.2
In part the derivational force of rational choice stems from the fact that its
veracity is entirely analytic. Ken Binmore acknowledges that the theory of
rational choice is in essence tautological; it asserts that actors maximize expected
utility but this essentially boils down to observing that in every choice, actors
by definition choose what they most prefer (Binmore 1994, 169). The model
imputes rationality to agents, and defines precisely the characteristics of pre-
ference and strategically rational choice that must obtain in order for individuals
to qualify as rational and for the formal models to pertain to concrete contexts.
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Expected utility theory is the preferred theory of instrumental action from the
1980s to the present, and as such is normative in defining the rules that agents
must comport with (Luce and Raiffa 1957). It is also prescriptive in providing
an analytic means to design institutions, legal frameworks, and public policies
on the assumptions that citizens and consumers are either rational actors, or if
they fail to comport with the dictates of the theory, are prone to systematic
failures of rational choice that should be remedied by the interventions of
policymakers and choice architects (Buchanan 1975; North 1990; Thaler and
Sunstein 2009). So long as rational choice cannot be falsified, and insofar as
actors who fail to exhibit consistent choice on its terms are labeled irrational, it
is difficult to argue against Aumann’s point that an important and perhaps chief
quality of game theory is its derivational ability to generate models that could
be applied to diverse social situations.
Here I briefly introduce the case of US nuclear deterrence which demon-
strates both of the tendencies that I have striven to document. On the one
hand, the type of modeling that was central to nuclear deterrence in the 1960s
is considered a form of “economics imperialism” and yet is better understood
to be an expression of the post-World War II rationality project (Thomas 2015;
Erickson 2015). On the other hand, at least one well-positioned contemporary
defense intellectual, Michael Desch, vehemently argues that the formal mod-
eling approach characterizing deterrence theory, which came to characterize
the mainstream approach adopted throughout the US academic profession of
political science in the 1980s, is purely analytic without any practical purchase
on real problems confronting military planners (Desch 2018).
Desch takes it for granted that the new wave of security studies generated by
the academic strategists to implement nuclear deterrence exemplifies economics
imperialism insofar as this research can best be characterized as “increasingly
abstract and methodologically-fixated … late Golden Age economic theories of
nuclear strategy” (Desch 2018, 7). Desch argues that nuclear deterrence theory
of the 1950s and 1960s typifies “the methods and approaches of Economics”
(ibid., 8). Because his main goal is to contend that this formal approach can lead
to endless analytically derived formal models that are of no use for steering
strategic policy, his goal is not to exhume the historical origins of this “Eco-
nomic approach.” Yet even in articulating his concern over the emptiness of
economic modeling applied to policies of nuclear deterrence, Desch acknowledges
the point I make throughout this chapter: the body of thought characterizing
rational deterrence is game theory. Desch quotes the World War II- and Cold
War-era British operations researcher P.M.S. Blackett, who complained about
the limitations of the rational strategists’ approach, that it did not “clothe the
skeleton conflicts of the theory of games with the complex flesh and blood
attributes of real nations; hence the bizarre nature of some of their practical
conclusions” (Blackett 1961, 16).
Yet despite his disinclination to excavate the origins of the theory that he
refers to as the Economic approach, Desch does much to document the
mushrooming formal analytic work on the one hand, paired against its
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increasing lack of policy applications on the other between 1980 and 2012. Formal
quantitative models increased to become approximately 50% of the research pre-
sented in top international relations journals during these three decades. Yet,
according to Desch, by 2010 the relevance of this research to practical pro-
blem-solving in policy venues dropped from full applicability in 1980 to as low
as no policy relevance today. Thus, in focusing on the case of nuclear deterrence
as a paradigmatic example of “economic imperialism” that would better be desig-
nated “rational choice imperialism,” or possibly “analytic formal imperialism,”
Desch provides a sustained and convincing argument that this expansion of sci-
entific method is derivational but not successful in achieving greater ontological
scope, increased powers of explanation, or enhanced predictive power.
Yet despite this tautological quality of much of the theoretical work under-
neath the rational choice umbrella, and the additional fact that behavioral
economists use canonical rational choice theory as the standard of pure ration-
ality that human subjects deviate from (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), via its
undeniable and much discussed imperialism, rational choice has come to have a
lot of impact on the structure of institutions, laws, and policies (e.g., Stern
2006). Thus, if the imperializing power of rational choice stems from its ability
to serve as the basis for deriving endless formal models under the assumption
that individuals maximize the expected utility reflected in the models, then the
cautionary notices put forward by Mäki, and by Clarke and Walsh are
significant.
Mäki warns that a scientific theory may be spread, as Ronald Coase warns us
about rational choice, with theorists’ hopes that they may be able to extract
increasing insights into the operation of phenomena without actually attaining
any actual ontological or epistemological unification from this derivational
capacity (Mäki 2009, 367; Coase 1978, 209). Mäki also worries that the type of
explanation that rational choice affords, even if it does turn out to be empiri-
cally sound, may tell us something about types of individuals in some categories
of circumstances without helping us to understand particular individuals with
specific identities. Even if a model were produced to predict the number of
suicides under a specific change in public policy under the assumptions of
rational agency, this theory would still be useless in predicting the actual suicide
of any one individual, or shedding light on that agent’s decision-making prior
to the indelible act.
Clarke and Walsh further worry that alternative ways of understanding social
phenomena and of accounting for human values may be eroded, or even lost
entirely. When challenged that they seem to imply a view of science that either
upholds progress as a telos along a singular developmental path, or must accept
a relativism of explanation, the authors defend the view that some theories can
progressively aid in offering superior explanations without also assuming that a
particular developmental path is a forgone conclusion. Clarke and Walsh defend
their view that despite the fact that imperialism seems to be self-vindicating,
because arguably scientists would not adopt theories unless they were motivated
by good reasons, still scientific expansion may offer unwelcome restrictions on
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understanding by eliminating alternatives rather than maintaining an effective
intellectual marketplace for ideas.
Here they finally hit on one of the primary reasons that “economics
imperialism” could be both abolishing potentially fruitful veins of discovery and
stifling creative wherewithal to engage in open exploration. In developing
these ideas, they point to the fact that imperialistic tendencies can follow from
the exercise of power rather than the self-vindicating nature of the scientific
method with expansionist tendencies. Thus, politically motivated rather than
intellectually vetted expansion could follow from the superior prestige of a field
that thus holds attraction to researchers in another discipline who seek to
borrow its pedigree in order to cater to audiences and funding opportunities.
For example, the prestige enjoyed by game theorists working on nuclear
deterrence helped to make game theory attractive to researchers in other fields)
(Amadae 2016).
In their final conclusion, Clarke and Walsh alight on another consideration
to ponder in evaluating the pros and cons of scientific imperialism. Let us
suppose that derivational expansion and success is not a sign of bad imperialism,
although by itself it does not entail either ontological or epistemological uni-
fication. Thus, the rational choice school could be a step in the constructive
expansion of a scientific approach. Perhaps, as Herbert Gintis (2009) suggests,
that at some later stage in the future, the rational choice revolution may
achieve the unification of the social and behavioral sciences because cognitive
science may reveal the truth-value of the elementary claims put forward by
game theory, that human brains are constructed to rank all outcomes on a
single scale of reference. However, even before this point was carefully estab-
lished, in the meantime expected utility theory could transform the social
world in its image if its basic tenets were absorbed throughout popular culture
to account for the nature of rational action and consumer choice (Clarke and
Walsh 2013, 349–350; Dixit 2010).
This suggestion is not far-fetched because research shows that individual
behavior can be changed to conform to the predictions of rational choice under
any of three circumstances. Students at elite institutions exposed to game
theory can become normalized to accept its understanding of rational self-
interest (Frank et al. 1993; Miller 1999). Not only are economics students more
prone to cheating, but also game theory actively condones cheating as rational
(McCabe and Trevino 1993, 1995; Nonacs 2013). Individuals who function in
institutions that only reward behavior with an incentive structure matching the
motivational structure suggested by rational choice will, rather than treat action
choices as intrinsically meaningful or worthwhile, tend to conform to incentives
relinquishing other motivational sets (Mazar and Ariely 2006). Encountering
actors whose behavior or self-understanding conforms to expected utility
theory and strategic rationality can also encourage action indistinguishable from
that predicted by non-cooperative game theory, and therefore can serve to
fragment bonds of trust among members of a society (Amadae 2016, 69–98).
Given the ongoing assertions by game theorists that they can capture
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everything of relevance throughout the social sciences and even, increasingly,
the humanities, within the scope of rational choice (e.g., Brams 2012), Clarke
and Walsh’s concern deserves to be heard.
5 Convergence of appraisal of the social significance of the
rational choice revolution
In this concluding section I will reflect briefly on the significance of the rational
choice revolution that impacted diverse fields throughout the social sciences
and professional programs. I urge rejecting the “economics imperialism” thesis
suggesting the increasing colonization of diverse disciplines using the template of
neoclassical economics. Not only do I argue that the former is a much more
accurate way to understand the development of rational choice as a distinctive
method that replaced neoclassical economics, but furthermore I suggest that
this broader perspective helps at least to raise the question of whether the late
20th-century shift in the social and behavioral sciences to the rational actor
model may signal a wider transformation of scientific approach to the study of
human society. Here I have in mind the scale of disciplinary transformation that
Michel Foucault argued best typifies the development of the human sciences
during the Enlightenment that was concurrent with the rise of panoptic dis-
ciplinary techniques (Foucault 1979). He further suggested, toward the end of his
scholarly career, that a similarly proportioned transformation may be entailed in
the late-modern shift to neoliberal political economy (Foucault 2010).
I invoke Foucault to make the case that scientific development is relative to
the aims and goals of scientists, and their intersection with the cultural milieu in
which their science must gain an institutional footing and demonstrate its
relevance. I am also not worried about the familiar charge of relativism that
referencing Foucault can induce. This is because I hold that even though, for
example, the Newtonian and Einsteinian scientific programs are incommen-
surable in their elementary assumptions and represent clear and distinct research
programs that study the same ontological substrata, still each is clearly valuable
and serves as a paradigmatic case of sound scientific theory. Incommensurability
does not necessarily imply that good science and bad science cannot be differ-
entiated because all are relative to the cultures and interests of scientists. Let us
suppose that scholasticism and the tactics of inquisition, spectacle, and divine
right of kings yielded to contradistinctive democratic will formation, surveil-
lance, and disciplining to achieve modern institutional efficiencies. It is similarly
possible that post-modern social science may now be predicated on a divergent
approach to human agency that dissolves the relevance of separate disciplines
because it demands that actors exhaustively rank world states, and strategically
compete against each other, in all domains of action. The brilliance of Fou-
cault’s work on regimes of knowledge production and the organization of
power is that he interrelates the authority of human scientists achieved through
scientific practices with their role in governing and normalizing behavior.
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In Prisoners of Reason (2016) I argue that orthodox rational choice entails four
unique assumptions about human behavior which, by being postulated as nor-
mative and prescriptive, have played a role in refashioning individual sub-
jectivity to comply with its demands. These unprecedented imperatives are:
(a) that only outcomes have value, and not the means or processes by which
outcomes are achieved (Hausman 2012, 53); (b) that the total value available
for consideration is finite and can be monetized (Giocoli 2006); (c) that indi-
viduals must compete against each other strategically without the ability for
working together in teams (Bacharach 2006); and (d) that impartial or disin-
terested action is prohibited under the assumption that every choice must further
agents’ goals (Sen 1985, in Sen 2002, 206–224). Although this concluding
section is not the place to explore these basic assumptions underlying the imper-
ialistic rationality project, it is easy to touch on how radical these assumptions are.
They deny the possibility of commitment, or the type of moral action con-
sistent with the classical liberal no-harm principle or Kantian-style side con-
straints on action requiring that actors avoid interfering with one another (Heath
2008). Game theory requires that the entire range of experiential value available
to agents be of one commensurable, finite type that must encompass aesthetic
beauty, tranquility, fulfillment, friendship, loyalty, and trust, in addition to fun-
gible rewards such as cash prizes or incentives. It rejects the possibility that actors
can act out of solidarity, and it invalidates the type of selfless charity or bene-
ficence characterizing the imperfect duties and positive virtues stipulated by the
classical liberal theorists Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant.
From this perspective, then, Clarke and Walsh’s warning that rational choice
imperialism may seep down into the common person’s worldview, authorita-
tively demarcating available ontologies for social expression and informing
agents’ self-understanding of traditional social rites and institutions is pertinent
(Clarke and Walsh 2009, 350). Rational choice imperialism is inconsistent with
the classical political economy of Adam Smith, which accepts negative and
positive virtue, the possibility of impartial judgments, and that markets must be
bounded by the rule of law (Smith] 1982 [1759; Amadae 2003, 205–219;
Amadae 2008), and is incommensurable with the neoclassical marginalists’
definition of rational action as obeying the law of diminishing marginal utility
and pertaining only to efficient means rather than the consistent and exhaustive
ranking of ends (Amadae 2003). Thus, it behooves us to step back and
appraise the full scope and dimensions of the transformation in social theory and
practice entailed by game theory.
I close by introducing Paul Forman’s article, “On the Historical Forms of
Knowledge Production and Curation: Modernity Entailed Disciplinarity,
Postmodernity Entails Antidisciplinarity” (2012), because through a distinct
method he arrives at almost identical conclusions to those put forward here
(and in Amadae 2016). He argues that there has been a comprehensive shift in
scientific inquiry that has entailed both the methods and conclusions that map
directly onto the 1970s epistemic solidification of the rational choice approach.
Where philosophers of economics discuss “economics imperialism,” and the
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increasing colonization of rational choice of formerly disparate disciplines,
Forman, a historian of science, notices a falling away of disciplines altogether as
formerly distinctive branches of knowledge are now unified under one singular
method. Interestingly, Forman identifies the same four distinctive attributes of
rational choice versus the traditional human sciences (including economics) that
preceded it. One is the transformation from the study of means, such as Rob-
bins discusses as the pertinent domain of economics, and legitimate processes to
a comprehensive focus on ends and outcomes (Forman 2012, 59). I concur
with Forman that Western European modern and liberal societies and human
sciences focused on fair and impartial means and procedures to generate out-
comes, and that this practice and institutional arrangement has fallen away
under the new rational choice appraisal of outcomes (see e.g., John Rawls as a
modern theorist, discussed by Forman (2012, 74)). Even knowledge production
itself ceases to be the result of disinterested processes wherein the integrity of
procedures is a mark of the effective and veridical establishment of truth-claims.
Whereas it was a key attribute of knowledge production throughout modernity
that scientists were disinterested, the rational choice approach holds that no
action can be disinterested, and even views the generation of truth-claims as
signaling techniques whereby the decision whether to utter a truth or falsehood
is a function of the preferences and how the speaker best profits (Forman 2012,
74, 79; Lewis 1969). Forman also notes that whereas solidarity was taken to be
constitutive of any healthy and vibrant community, in postmodernity solidarity,
or working together with a joint goal, has negligible to no credibility as a
meaningful category of action (Forman 2012, 87, 88; Tuck 2008). Forman also
points to how the core values underlying modern liberalism were assumed to
be universally relevant to all actors, whereas under rational choice, all actors’
appraisal of value must be relative to their own personal holdings that accu-
rately identify each individual’s opportunity costs for giving up one favorable
outcome to achieve a more favorable outcome.
In conclusion, Forman’s argument that the modern disciplines that have been
coextensive with the modern human sciences have very recently yielded to a new,
ends-driven, performance metric-sensitive, individualistic, and self-interested
mode of inquiry, correlates with the attributes of the rational choice revolution
that I have earmarked as foundational. This convergence helps to render cred-
ible the idea that not only is the so-called “economic imperialism” of game
theory more indicative of a cross-disciplinary transformation than a vindicated
exercise of scientific unification, but also that the copious attention devoted to
evaluating the significance of this imperialism is crucial.
Notes
1 Rational choice theory became the designation for the family of theories that grew
out of the new approach to decision-making put forward by von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944, 1947), and it includes decision theory (applicable to single agents),
cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, social choice, public choice, positive
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political theory, and public policy analysis. See Amadae (2003) and Erickson (2015). Luce
and Raiffa (1957) wrote the first authoritative text; see also Shubik (1982), which toge-
ther with von Neumann and Morgenstern, demonstrate that game theory was a new
approach to studying social interactions that became central to multiple disciplines
throughout the social sciences, including economics. Nicolas Guilhot and Alain Marciano
argue in “Rational Choice as Neo-Decisionism: Decision-Making in Political Science
and Economics after 1945” (in this volume) that the standard “economics imperialism”
thesis is misguided for overlooking the fact that the disciplinary transformation
centering on rational decision-making largely occurred outside economics.
2 Jaakko Kuorikoski and Aki Lehtinen (2010) argue that it may be possible to make
analytic progress via the means of derivation. However, ultimately this would need to
be directly associated with empirical testing to count as a means of making progress
in social science.
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